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I. 
ARGUMENT 
A, The overwhelming authority cited by UBIC dictates that the targeted tender rule 
be adopted. 
The threshold question to be answered in this appeal is whether the targeted tender 
rule applies to the facts of this case.1 No Utah court has ever decided the question of whether 
an insured, who is covered by two policies insuring a loss, may elect which of the insurers 
is to cover the loss. While this case is set against the factual backdrop of workers 
compensation, the question is one of broader insurance law. Several other states have 
confronted this issue and, contrary to the order that was entered in this case by the district 
court, have, on similar facts to this case, unanimously endorsed an insured's right to choose 
whether, and to whom, a claim should be tendered. This Court should do likewise. 
In its simplest form, the targeted tender rule recognizes the common-sense approach 
to resolving disputes among multiple policies potentially insuring a loss. The rule grants an 
insured, as the contracting party with the insurers, and as the party paying the premiums, the 
right to determine who should pay a claim on its behalf. The result of the insured's election 
is a cost-sharing of the loss only among those policies to whom the insured tendered the 
claim and who are, therefore, legally obligated to pay the claim. This may include some, or 
in most instances, all of the insurers that could be potentially liable for the loss. However, 
1
 If the targeted tender rule is adopted, then all other issues related to this appeal are 
moot. 
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the insured has a paramount right to decide who should, and who should not, pay the claim. 
Legion Ins. Co. v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co.. 822 N.E.2d 1, 4-5 (111. 2004). Indeed, 
there is no one better positioned to make this determination that the insured. Once the 
insured makes its election, only then do the "other insurance" clauses, if any, determine how 
the loss should be allocated among those insurers obligated to pay the claim. See, £,&., John 
Bums Construction Co. v. Indiana Ins. Co.. 727 N.E.2d 211,217 (111. 2000). 
Several facts in this case present a particularly strong case for adopting the targeted 
tender rule and reversing the district court's order: Pioneer was covered by two insurance 
policies at the time of Mr. Antone's industrial accident2; Pioneer tendered to one of these 
insurers (WCF) to satisfy its obligation to provide workers compensation insurance for its 
employees; Pioneer expressly refused to tender the claim to its other insurer (UBIC); and 
nothing in the insurance policies at issue prohibits targeted tender or requires that a claim be 
tendered. Pioneer had a paramount right to determine whether to tender Mr. Antone's claim 
to WCF, UBIC, or both. Consistent with this right, Pioneer only tendered the claim to WCF, 
which obligated WCF, and only WCF, to pay the claim. The presence of an "other 
insurance" clause does not permit WCF to forcibly tender the claim to UBIC, and trample 
the rights of its insured, Pioneer. 
2
 For purposes of targeted tender, UBIC accepts this position. 
Page 2 of26 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1. Tendering is the key, and Pioneer never tendered the claim. 
The law from numerous states requires that notice of a claim be given by an insured 
to an insurer to trigger an insurer's obligation to defend/indemnify under the policy. See, 
e ^ , Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. USF Ins. Co.. 191 P.3d 866,873 (Wash. 2008) (u[A]n 
insurer cannot be expected to anticipate when or if an insured will make a claim for 
coverage; the insured must affirmatively inform the insurer that its participation is desired.) 
(emphasis added); Cargill Inc. v. ACE American Ins. Co.. 784 N.W.2d 341, 354 (Minn. 
2010); Foster-Gardner. Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins Co.. 18 Cal. 4th 857, 869, 77 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 107 (1998); Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company v. Gulf Insurance Company. 
776 F.2d 1380,1383 (7th Cir. 1985); Casualty Indem. Exch. Ins. Co. v. Liberty Natl Fire Ins. 
Co.. 902 F. Supp. 1235,1239 (D. Mont. 1995); 14 Couch on Insurance § 200.40 (noting that 
the insured is required to tender a claim to all insurers which the insured wants to respond 
to the claim). Where an insured never provides notice of the claim to an insurer, and/or never 
tenders the claim, there is no obligation on the insurer to defend/indemnify the insured. See 
id; see also Cellex Biosciences. Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.. 537 N.W.2d 621, 
623 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) ("Tender is a condition precedent to creation of a duty to 
indemnify."); Solo Cup v. Federal Insurance Co.. 619 F.2d 1178, 1183 (7th Cir. 1980); 
Cincinnati Cos. v. West Am. Ins. Co.. 701 N.E.2d 499, 504 (111. 1998); Sharon Steel Corp. 
v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co.. 931 P.2d 127,137 (Utah 1997) (holding that contribution by one 
insurer from another is only permitted where the other insurer(s) had an equal legal 
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obligation to defend the insured yet failed to do so). These sound principles are at the heart 
of the targeted tender rule. 
WCF does not cite any cases for the proposition that tendering a claim is an irrelevant 
and superfluous requirement, or that there exists in the law the concept of an implied, 
constructive, or de facto tender. Nevertheless, WCF seeks to avoid the undisputed facts 
regarding tender in this case by arguing that: (1) there is no tendering requirement for 
workers compensation claims - the insurer's coverage obligation is triggered regardless of 
whether it receives a tender of the claim; (2) notice of a claim by an injured worker to his/her 
employer, and the constructive notice that is implied thereby to the insurer, is the legal and 
functional equivalent of tendering a claim, and that no notice/tender of the claim by the 
employer to its insurer is required; and (3) notice by an injured employee to his/her employer 
immediately, irrevocably, and automatically triggers every potential insurer's duty to pay 
(subject to any defenses), regardless of the wishes of the insured or whether the claim has 
been specifically tendered to fewer than all potential insurers. However, these arguments are 
contradicted by the extensive case law cited herein and in UBIC's opening brief. See id. 
Tendering a claim does matter3, and notice to the insurer, however minimal, is required to 
3
 The consequence of eliminating the notice/tender requirement obligates an insurance 
company to interfere with an insured's affairs, even where it has not been asked to do so. In 
other words, an insurer will be forced to inquire frequently of its insureds whether all claims 
have been reported, because the insurer will be liable for even unreported claims. With no 
consequences to the insured, claims could potentially go unreported for years (as occurred 
in this case), only to arise long after the fact, thereby prejudicing an insurer's ability to 
defend the claim. This result runs contrary to well-established case law. See, e.g., Hartford 
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trigger an insurer's obligation under the policy. See id The fact that this is a workers 
compensation case does not alter this long-standing principle of insurance law. 
The authority cited also demonstrates that an insured holding multiple policies 
potentially covering a loss has the right to tender a claim to some, or all, of its insurers. See, 
e.g.. Mutual of Enumclaw. 191 P.3d at 873; Burns. 727 N.E.2d at 217. This is one of the 
benefits of having multiple policies insuring against the same type of loss. This is the right 
granted to an insured who has "overinsured" for a particular loss. Pioneer should not be 
stripped of its legally recognized rights and benefits. 
2. Failing to tender a claim cannot be a breach of an insurance policy. 
WCF' s arguments regarding failing to tender as a breach of the workers compensation 
contract are nonsensical. Insurance policies of nearly all types impose an obligation on an 
insured to give timely notice of a claim - if a claim is going to be made - to allow the insurer 
to investigate the claim. Descriptions of the event, and the availability of any witnesses, only 
decrease as time passes. The notice requirement is, therefore, only for the benefit of the 
insurer. An insurer is never prejudiced if the insured never tenders the claim because no 
insurer has an incentive to force its insureds to make claims. Although the failure to timely 
tender a claim can give rise to additional defenses to payment of the claim, the failure to 
tender a claim is not a breach of the policy. 
Accident and Indemnity. 776 F.2d at 1383 (citations omitted) ("an insurance company 
[should not be] required to intermeddle officiously where its services have not been 
requested."). 
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In this case, the requirement in the workers compensation policy that Pioneer notify 
UBIC regarding any potential claims is only a requirement if Pioneer is seeking to make a 
claim under the UBIC policy. Pioneer never did seek to make such a claim, and neither 
UBIC nor WCF can force Pioneer to tender the claim. Institute of London Underwriters v. 
Hartford Fire Insurance Company, 599 N.E.2d 1311,1313 (111. Ct.App. 1992); Bituminous 
Casualty Corp. v. Roval Insurance Co. of America, 704 N.E.2d 74, 79 (111. 1998); Hartford 
Accident and Indemnity, 776 F.2d at 1383. Moreover, by failing to tender a claim to UBIC, 
but tendering the claim to WCF, Pioneer still satisfied its obligation to provide workers 
compensation insurance for its employees. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-201 (2008). 
Therefore, targeted tender, even among multiple workers compensation insurance policies, 
is viable, and should be adopted. 
3. The targeted tender rule frequently arises under circumstances where 
insurance is required, A workers compensation insurance scenario does 
not require a different result 
UBIC admits that the targeted tender rule has not been applied in any reported workers 
compensation case. However, neither the unique nature of this case, nor the statutory 
requirement that workers compensation insurance be maintained, changes the fact that the 
rule should be applied in this case. General liability insurance is statutorily required for 
contractors; homeowners insurance is contractually required for any home encumbered by 
a mortgage; and automobile insurance is statutorily required for all vehicle owners. Many 
of the cases cited in UBIC' s opening brief apply the targeted tender rule under circumstances 
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where insurance was required for a construction project, though this does not distinguish 
them. That workers compensation insurance, as opposed to general liability insurance, is at 
issue in this case is irrelevant. No case has limited its holding to a particular type of 
insurance, and no such limitation is warranted given the policy justifications underpinning 
the targeted tender rule. 
Consider the following example of how a targeted tender claim could (and likely does) 
arise in Utah: 
As a homeowner is pulling into his garage, he mistakenly 
presses the accelerator instead of the brake and crashes through 
the back wall of the garage into the living room. The 
homeowner recently purchased his home and he maintains 
homeowners insurance, which is contractually required by his 
mortgage lender. He also maintains automobile insurance, 
which is statutorily required in Utah, and contractually required 
by the automobile lender. Both the automobile and the 
homeowners policies have "other insurance" clauses. 
Under these circumstances, the homeowner has the right to make a claim under the 
homeowners policy, the automobile policy, both policies, or neither policy.4 Such is the case 
as both policies, subject to any limits on liability, can cover the loss. In addition, neither 
insurer can compel the other to pay absent a tender from the homeowner. In this regard, if 
the homeowner elects to pay for the claim personally, and does not tender a claim to either 
4
 Obviously, given the requirement for workers compensation insurance coverage, the 
"neither" option would not be available to an employer. However, the employer could still 
tender to either carrier, or both carriers, in a targeted tender situation, and still satisfy its 
obligation to provide workers compensation insurance for its employees. 
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insurer, neither insurer is required to pay. The argument is no different where the claim is 
tendered to fewer than all available insurers because liability is predicated upon tendering 
theclaim. See, e.g.. Mutual of Enumclaw. 191 P.3d at 873; Cellex Biosciences, 537 N.W.2d 
at 623; Hartford Accident and Indemnity, 776 F.2d at 1383; Foster-Gardner, 18 Cal. 4th at 
869, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 107; Buss v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 4th 35,46, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 366 
(1997). Only where the homeowner tenders to both insurers, which triggers the legal 
obligation of both insurers to pay, does the question of equitable contribution arise. S^e, e.g.. 
Mutual of Enumclaw, 191 P.3d at 872 (citing Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Mut. of Enumclaw 
Ins. Co., 826 P.2d 1315 (Idaho 1992)). Absent a tender to multiple insurers, there cannot be 
a claim for equitable contribution. This is true for workers compensation policies as well as 
any other insurance policy. 
In this case, like those cited herein, Pioneer was covered by two insurance policies. 
Pioneer made an affirmative election to direct coverage for the claim to one insurer - WCF. 
Pioneer's wishes should be respected. The targeted tender rule should be adopted. 
4. WCF has no contractual right to equitable contribution (and no right to 
equitable contribution under any other theory). 
WCF argues that by allowing targeted tender it would "strip WCF of its contractual 
right of equitable pro rata contribution from a co-insurer allowed by the 'other insurance5 
clause." See Response Brief, p. 41. WCF's broad conclusion is not supported by the facts 
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of this case or the law.5 
Ordinarily, where an insured has concurrent coverage for the same liability, both of 
its insurers are obligated to provide coverage under the terms of their respective policies and 
their coverage obligations are then coordinated, typically by reference to the policies' "other 
insurance" provisions. However, "other insurance" clauses only affect insurers' rights 
among themselves; they do not affect the insured's right to selectively tender a claim to one 
insurer alone. See, e.g.. Bums, 727 N.E.2d at 216-17. 
The Illinois Supreme Court held that an insured has the exclusive right to determine 
whether to trigger coverage under an available policy by allowing the insured to make a 
targeted tender of its claim to one of several potential insurers, irrespective of the presence 
of an "other insurance" clause. Burns, 727 N.E.2d at 217; Bituminous, 704 N.E.2d 74. As 
stated by the Burns court: 
It is only when an insurer's policy is triggered that the insurer 
becomes liable for the defense and indemnity costs of a claim 
and it becomes necessary to allocate the loss among co-insurers. 
The loss will be allocated according to the terms of the "other 
5
 Aside from the principles of targeted tender that are contravened by WCF's 
argument, equitable contribution is never contractual - it is equity based. OneBeacon 
America Ins. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 808, 175 Cal. App. 4th 183, 
204 (2009) ("The right of equitable contribution between insurers is not controlled by the 
contract between the insured and the insurer but by equitable principles"). Such is the case 
here because there isn't agreement to cost-share a loss between UBIC and WCF. Signal 
Cos., Inc. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 27 Cal. 3d 359, 369, 612 P.2d 889 (1980) ("The reciprocal 
rights and duties of several insurers who have covered the same event do not arise out of 
contract, for their agreements are not with each other") (quoting Am. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Seaboard Sur. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 192, 195-96,318 P.2d 84 (1957)). 
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insurance" clauses, if any, in the policies that have been 
triggered. 
An "other insurance" clause in a policy will not automatically 
reach into coverages provided under other policies merely 
because such other policies are in existence. The insured still 
must be given the right to determine whether it wishes to invoke 
its rights to such other coverages before those coverages 
become accessible under the "other insurance"provision oj a 
triggered policy. 
An "other insurance" provision does not in itself overcome the 
right of an insured to tender defense of an action to one insurer 
alone. 
Bums, 727 N.E.2d at 216-217 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
The targeted insurer has the sole responsibility to defend and indemnify the insured, 
thereby foreclosing a claim for equitable contribution from the excluded insurer. See; idL An 
insurer does not have the right to trigger another insured's coverage under a separate policy 
in contravention of the insured's wishes. See id. 
To allow WCF to forcibly tender the claim to UBIC and seek equitable contribution 
effectively transforms WCF into a third-party beneficiary of the UBIC-Pioneer contract.6 
6
 WCF denies that such is that case on the basis of the "other insurance" clause. 
However, numerous cases have rejected this same argument. See, e^g., Bums, 727 N.E.2d 
at 216-217; Institute of London Underwriters, 599 N.E.2d at 1315; Bituminous Casualty 
Corp., 704 N.E.2d at 79; Casualty Indem. Exch. Ins. Co., 902 F. Supp. 1235. See also 15 
Couch on Insurance § 219:1; 219:9. Each of these cases concluded that an insured triggers 
an insurer's liability, not an "other insurance" clause. 
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This contravenes not only the expressed wishes of Pioneer (who did not want UBIC to get 
involved (see R. 346)), but also well-established case law. See, e.g., Benjamin v. Arnica 
Mut.Ins.Co.,2006UT37,140P.3d 1210,1213 (Utah 2006) ("An insurance policy is merely 
a contract between the insured and the insurer."); Bybee v. Abdulla, 2008 UT 35, 189 P.3d 
40,49 (2008) ("The benefits conferred by contracts are presumed to flow exclusively to the 
parties who sign the contracts/') (citing Tracy Collins Bank & Trust v. Dickamore, 652 P.2d 
1314, 1315-16 (Utah 1982)); Casualty Indem. Exch. Ins. Co., 902 F. Supp. at 1239 fn. 4 (D. 
Mont. 1995) (citations omitted) (emphasis added); Maryland Cas. Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 
218 F.3d 204, 210-211 (2d Cir. 2000); Bituminous Casualty Corp., 704 N.E.2d at 79; 
Cincinnati Cos., 701 N.E.2d 499; Mutual of Enumclaw, 191 P.3d at 872. Only under 
circumstances where the contract "clearly intended to confer a separate and distinct benefit 
upon the third party" can it be enforced by a third-party beneficiary. Broadwater v. Old 
Republic Sur., 854 P.2d 527, 536 (Utah 1993). No such circumstances exist in this case. 
There is no agreement between UBIC and WCF to cost-share, nor is there any credible 
legal basis for anointing WCF a third-party beneficiary of the UBIC-Pioneer insurance 
contract. Pioneer exercised its paramount right not to tender the claim to UBIC. Without a 
tender of the claim, UBIC was never a "co-insurer" because only WCF was obligated to pay 
the claim. And, with no other insurer obligated to pay the claim, there is no other insurer 
with whom WCF can apportion the loss pursuant to the "other insurance" clause. See 15 
Couch on Insurance § 219:1; 219:9. Simply put, there is no "other" insurance. 
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Additionally, Pioneer did not, as WCF argues, disclaim WCF's right to equitable 
contribution. A claim for equitable contribution requires that both parties share liability for 
a loss, and one party seeks to equalize payment in relation to liability. Casualty Indem. Exch. 
Ins. Co.. 902 F. Supp. at 1237; Mutual of Enumclaw. 191 P.3d at 872; Sharon Steel 931 P.2d 
at 137. The law in this regard is well settled. Equitable contribution claims among insurers 
arise "post-tender." If there is no tender, there is no duty to pay. Cellex Biosciences. 537 
N.W.2d at 623. If there is no duty to pay, there is no basis for a claim of equitable 
contribution against the non-liable insurer. See, e ^ , Casualty Indem. Exch. Ins. Co.. 902 
F. Supp. at 1237; Mutual of Enumclaw. 191 P.3d at 872; Sharon Steel 931 P.2d at 137. It 
is an undisputed fact in this case that Pioneer never tendered, or even provided notice to 
UBIC, of its desire that UBIC pay the claim. In fact, Pioneer did exactly the opposite by 
instructing UBIC not to pay the claim. R„ 346. Therefore, UBIC's obligation to pay was 
never triggered, and it never shared liability for the claim with WCF. There was never 
anything for Pioneer to disclaim. 
The cases cited by WCF regarding targeted tender's applicability to this case do little 
to contradict the great weight of authority cited by UBIC. See Response Brief p. 47-48. In 
each case cited by WCF, the question presented to the court was whether there was a claim 
for equitable contribution. However, these claims arose post-tender after the insurer's 
liability to pay, subject to any defenses, was already established. For instance, in 
Underwriters of Lloyd's v. Massachusetts Bonding and Insurance Co., 230 P.3d 103 (Ore. 
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2010), the question presented was whether an insurer can settle a claim and thereby be 
relieved of any future claims for contribution based upon a release of liability signed by the 
insured. The court explained that claims for equitable contribution are not based upon 
subrogation or contract theory, but on principles of equity. Id. at 113. Unlike the case before 
this Court, in Underwriter's of Lloyd's each insurer was liable for the loss and the release 
was a post-tender attempt by the insurers, after having settled their claim with the insurer, to 
limit any future liability to other insurers. The issue of liability under the policy, such as 
whether the claim was tendered by the insured, was not at issue. Likewise, in American 
States Insurance Company v. National Fire Insurance Company of Hartford, Case No. 
D057673 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), the question presented was whether the equitable contribution 
claim was time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations, or whether it could survive as 
a subrogation claim. There was no indication that the insured failed to tender to one of the 
insurers or that only one insurer was otherwise liable to pay the claim, subject to any defenses 
it might assert (e.g., the statute of limitations defense that was ultimately successful). These 
cases, therefore, have no bearing on the application of targeted tender in this case. 
In this case, the question of equitable contribution is never reached because there is 
only one party obligated to pay - WCF. There is no other policy from which WCF can seek 
equitable contribution. UBIC was under no obligation to pay the claim because of Pioneer's 
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election not to tender the claim.7 WCF's claim for equitable contribution must be denied and 
the order of the district court reversed. 
5. Policy considerations weigh in favor of adopting the targeted tender rule. 
UBIC agrees that there are strong policy considerations that underlie the workers 
compensation system. Perhaps chief among these is to assure injured workers that there is 
workers compensation insurance in place to administer and, if necessary, pay for valid 
claims. In fact, so strong are these policy considerations that insurance exists even for those 
employers that don't have insurance - such insurance being provided by the Uninsured 
Employers' Fund. These policy considerations are unaffected by the targeted tender rule. 
WCF argues that adopting the targeted tender rule will put injured workers at risk of 
not having their benefits paid. However, WCF's fears regarding targeted tender are based 
upon a perceived ability by an insured to not tender to any carrier, leaving the injured worker 
without any insurer to pay benefits. Such an argument exposes WCF's misunderstanding 
with regard to the targeted tender rule in a workers compensation context. If a polic)rtiolder, 
such as Pioneer, elects, for whatever reason, either intentionally or unintentionally, to have 
7
 Clearly, if Pioneer only had one policy in place, there would be no opportunity for 
an election. Pioneer was only presented with a choice because it had multiple policies. Had 
Pioneer been insured by three insurers, but tendered to only two of them, an equitable 
contribution claim would exist among the two insurers to whom the claim was tendered, and 
the loss would be allocated pursuant to the "other insurance" clauses in those policies, if any. 
The insurers to whom the claim was tendered could not force the non-targeted insurer to 
share in the loss because the non-targeted insurer had no obligation to pay the claim. In 
addition, under these circumstances the "other insurance" clause would serve its intended 
purpose - apportioning the loss among those carriers liable to pay. 
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multiple workers compensation policies in place for a given time period, a targeted tender 
of a claim to one or both of these carriers in no way diminishes coverage for an injured 
worker. The consequences are felt only by the insurers. Such is the case as an employer with 
multiple policies insuring a single event must elect to tender the claim to one or both carriers. 
Failing to tender the claim to any carrier is not an option in Utah because of the statutory 
mandate that workers compensation coverage be in place. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-201. 
Therefore, allowing an insured to make a targeted tender will never affect the rights of an 
injured worker because the claim will always be tendered to at least one carrier. There will 
never be any confusion regarding which insurer is to pay benefits because the insurer who 
was targeted will be required to pay (assuming there are not any other defenses to payment). 
Payments will be promptly made to the injured worker by the targeted insurer, and the 
subsequent litigation, if any, between insurers in targeted tender situations will always be 
focused on whether there is a claim for equitable contribution. 
In this case, Pioneer paid the premiums for two policies, each of which is sufficient 
to cover all of Mr. Antone's claim. It should have the right to direct coverage among the 
two policies fully insuring the event. If the goal of the workers compensation system is to 
protect the injured worker, adopting the targeted tender rule does not, in any way, inhibit this 
goal. 
In addition, the corruption and widespread calamity foreseen by WCF if the targeted 
tender rule is adopted represents misplaced fear mongering. The circumstances presented 
Page 15 of 26 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
by this case are very rare, and the lack of reported cases on the issue substantiates its 
infrequency. To underscore its rarity, WCF did not cite to one instance where it has been 
faced with a situation of dual coverage, and pursuant to an "other insurance" clause, was able 
to split a claim pro-rata. The reason for the absence of such a citation is because this 
situation rarely arises. It is very rare for an insured event to be covered by two policies; it 
is even more rare for an insured to have paid the premiums for two policies without receiving 
any additional coverage; and it is even more rare still for an insured to elect which insurer 
is to pay. Each policy in this case, standing alone, was sufficient to cover one hundred 
percent of Mr. Antone's injuries. In fact, because workers compensation policies are not 
subject to limits on liability, Pioneer, when it secured coverage through WCF, did not need 
any additional insurance; rather, it could have depended on WCF to cover, in full, any claim 
that was made. Adopting the targeted tender rule will not, as WCF claims, require an 
overhaul of the workers compensation system because to require WCF to pay Mr. Antone's 
claim is not requiring WCF to do any more than it was already contracted to do, and, more 
importantly, requested to do by Pioneer when it tendered the claim. To find otherwise would 
result in a windfall to WCF. 
These targeted tender situations are also very rare because an insured rarely has a 
preference regarding which insurer pays a claim - they just want the claim paid. The result 
is that, nearly always, an insured will tender a claim to all available insurers, thereby 
triggering the "other insurance" clauses, if any, in the policies, and apportioning the loss 
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among all insurers required to pay. See 15 Couch on Insurance § 219:1; 219:9. Thus, by 
the very nature of the facts presented, the targeted tender rule will be limited to a very 
specific set of facts that arise very infrequently. 
Moreover, there is nothing amiss about allowing an insured to choose to whom it 
wishes to tender a claim. In fact, courts have stated this is a "paramount right" held by the 
insured.8 As noted by one court: 
When several insurance policies are available to the insured, that 
insured has the paramount right to choose or knowingly forego 
an insurer's participation in a claim. The insured may choose to 
forego an insurer's assistance for various reasons, including the 
insured's fear that premiums would increase or that the policy 
would be cancelled in the future. Moreover, an insured's ability 
to forego that assistance should be protected. . . . When an 
insured has knowingly chosen to forego an insurer's assistance 
by instructing the insurer not to involve itself in the litigation, 
the insurer is relieved oj its obligation to the insured with 
regard to that claim. The targeted insurer, then, has the sole 
responsibility to defend and indemnify the insured. That insurer 
may not seek equitable contribution from the other insurers that 
were not designated by the insured. 
Legion Ins. Co., 822 N.E.2d at 4-5 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The wishes of the 
Understandably, the subcontractors, who were typically at the epicenter of the targeted 
tender decisions in other states, did not want to tender to their own insurers, but to another 
insurance carrier insuring the project. The courts that have adopted/applied the targeted 
tender rule have recognized the financial benefits the insured would reap, such as avoiding 
an increase in premium or cancellation of its policy, if targeted tender is permitted. 
Nevertheless, in each instance, the wishes of the insured were respected and the targeted 
tender was allowed. There is no evidence in any of these cases that the choice among 
insurance carriers affected the benefits paid, only the insurer obligated to pay them. 
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insured should be respected.9 
The numerous cases cited by UBIC demonstrate that the legal underpinnings of the 
targeted tender rule are commonly-accepted doctrines. When presented with an opportunity 
to review and evaluate a targeted tender situation, the targeted tender rule has been very 
nearly unanimously accepted by those courts considering the issue. As the party purchasing 
the insurance, the insured should have the right to determine whether, and to whom, a claim 
should be tendered. Relatedly, no insurer should be forced to pay a claim against the express 
wishes of its own insured. The targeted tender rule should be adopted in Utah and the 
judgment of the district court reversed. 
B. If the targeted tender rule is not adopted, the case should be remanded for 
further discovery. 
Aside from the efficiency of resolving cases quickly, an important component of Utah 
R. Civ. P. 56 is to ensure that diligent efforts to conduct discovery are not prematurely ended 
by the entry of summary judgment. Brown v. Glover, 16 P.3d 540 (Utah 2000) (citing Price 
Dev.Co..L.P.v.OremCitv. 2000 UT 26,t30,995 P.2d 1237 (2000)); Strand v. Associated 
Students of the University of Utah, 561 P.2d 191, 194 (Utah 1977); see also 10B Charles 
9
 There are numerous reasons why Pioneer might elect to tender the claim only to 
WCF. One particular reason could be that, like any insured, Pioneer is concerned about its 
insurance premiums. Because of the way in which premiums are calculated, which is a 
function of an employer's experience modification factor, a tender to both WCF and UBIC 
would negatively impact Pioneer's premiums for a longer period of time than if the claim is 
tendered only to WCF. The long-term negative impact of the forced tender to both carriers 
is unpalatable in light of Pioneer's expressed desire. 
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Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 
2740 (3d ed. 1998) ("The purpose of [Rule 56(f)] is to provide an additional safeguard 
against an improvident or premature grant of summary judgment... and [the rule] should 
be applied with a spirit of liberality."); Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f). It seeks to prevent what is 
colloquially deemed "a rush to judgment."10 Not surprisingly, with an entry of judgment 
already in its favor, WCF believes that no further discovery is necessary. However, 
additional factual discovery clearly is necessary in this case to resolve the factual issue of 
intent. 
Intent is always a complicated and difficult factual issue to resolve, particularly on 
summary judgment. For this reason it often results in a reversal where discovery was not 
completed. See, e.g.. West One Trust Company v. Morrison, 861 P.2d 1058,1062 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993) ("A motion for summary judgment may not be granted if. . . there is a factual 
issue as to what the parties intended.") (quoting Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104,108 
(Utah 1991)). 
Intent is particularly important in the context of insurance policies. "The intent and 
understanding of the parties to an insurance contract is far more important than the strict and 
literal sense of the words used in the contract; thus, it is equally important to consider the 
This is precisely what happened in this case. In fact, WCF filed its motion for 
summary judgment prior to even answering UBIC's first set of written discovery. No 
depositions were ever taken. Few cases are so clear factually that little or no discovery is 
required, and this case is certainly not one of them. 
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subject matter of the insurance and the subject or object which the parties had in view at that 
time." See Couch on Insurance § 22:7. Couch continues: "it is often considered proper to 
consider the business of the parties, the circumstances surrounding the making of the 
contract, the situation of the property, and all other conditions which have a legitimate 
bearing on the parties' intention." IcL "Mistake" for purposes of an insurance contract has 
been held to be a belief which is not consistent with the facts surrounding the risk and/or 
issuance of the policy. See Couch on Insurance § 27:2. Where an insurance policy does not 
reflect the parties' intent, the source of the mistake is irrelevant. See, e.g.. Couch on 
Insurance § 26:1 (citing St. Louis County Nat. Bank v. Maryland Cas. Co., 564 S.W.2d 920 
(Mo.Ct.App. 1978)). 
Prior to the entry of summary judgment by the district court, UBIC did not have the 
opportunity to show, aside from providing affidavits, that there was a dispute regarding 
intent. The evidence provided - the Declaration of John Stout - makes it clear that Pioneer 
did not intend the two policies to overlap.11 This declaration created a material issue of fact 
that was improperly disregarded by the district court. It provides clear evidence of Pioneer's 
intent at the time it sought to find a new workers compensation carrier. The declaration 
withstands scrutiny, particularly for purposes of summary judgment, because Pioneer is not 
1
 * There is no benefit to a insured to double-insure for workers compensation. While 
"other insurance" clauses make sense in the context where there are other insurance policies 
that could provide additional or excess coverage, workers compensation does not foster a 
need for these other policies. Compensable claims are fully covered by the insurer. 
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a party to this litigation and does not stand to benefit significantly from this litigation. 
Moreover, if WCF believes Mr. Stout was being untruthful in any way, WCF could have 
deposed Mr. Stout prior to filing its motion for summary judgment.12 WCF could also have 
contacted Mr. Stout, who is not a party to this litigation, to discuss the contents of the 
declaration or his October of 2010 letter if they believed there was anything untruthful. WCF 
did not do so. The result is that the declaration and statements of Mr. Stout are unopposed 
and must be accepted as true for purposes of the motion for summary judgment. The trial 
court clearly ignored these facts in rendering its decision. It was also premature by the 
district court to determine that UBIC could not, under any circumstances, prove its defenses 
when so little time had been given to conduct discovery.13 See, e.g.. Warner v. Sirstins, 838 
P.2d 666, 669 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Robert Langston Ltd. v. McOuarrie. 741 P.2d 
554, 557 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)); Grahn v. Gregory. 800 P.2d 320, 327 n. 8 (Utah Ct. App. 
12
 The lack of discovery in this case has allowed WCF to run wild with assumptions, 
theories, and unfounded allegations that are based upon little more than conjecture. It is 
unfortunate that summary judgment was granted on such a meager factual record when 
material questions of fact abound. One deposition - the deposition of Mr. Stout - would 
likely have resolved many of the factual issues that continue to plague this case. While 
UBIC does not deny that the original policy has an inception date of February 22,2008, this 
is explained by the statements of Mr. Stout. Both WCF and UBIC dispute the effect of these 
two facts - hence the factual dispute that was ignored by the district court. There are no 
other facts to which WCF can cite to explain what happened in February of 2008. The result 
is that WCF's brief is littered with the opinions and beliefs of WCF. Additional discovery-
is the only way to resolve this factual dispute. 
13
 The focus has been on the intent of Mr. Stout; however, the stifled discovery period 
also did not allow for the deposition to be taken of the broker of the policy with whom Mr. 
Stout met. 
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1990); Mabev v. Kav Peterson Constr. Co., 682 P.2d 287,290 (Utah 1984); Jensen v. Manila 
Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. 565 P.2d 63,64 (Utah 1977) (citing 
Sine v. Harper. 118 Utah 415, 429, 222 P.2d 571, 578-79 (1950)); Salt Lake County v. 
Western Dairymen Coop.. Inc.. 2002 UT 39.48 P.3d 910 (2002). 
Once this case is remanded and the parties are permitted to finish discovery, the 
testimony of Mr. Stout is admissible to explain intent. Utah courts have repeatedly explained 
that parol evidence is admissible to show intent in the context of mutual mistake. As 
summarized by the Utah Court of Appeals: 
[PJarol evidence may be admissible to show mutual mistake, 
occurring " 'when both parties, at the time of contracting, 
share a misconception about a basic assumption or vital fact 
upon which they based their bargain.''' Warner v. Sirstins. 838 
P.2d 666. 669 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting Robert Langston Ltd. 
v. McOuarrie. 741 P.2d 554, 557 (Utah App.) cert, denied. 765 
P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987)). 
West One. 861 P.2d 1058 at (emphasis added). Whether Mr. Stout's testimony, along with 
others, will be sufficient to show mutual mistake at trial is not known. What is clear is that 
it was reversible error for the district court to find that there were no circumstances under 
which UBIC could prove its defense of mutual mistake. 
The question of mutual mistake is factual in nature. Despite its material and disputed 
nature, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of WCF without allowing UBIC 
the chance to conduct any depositions or conduct additional written discovery regarding the 
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intent of the parties to the policy. Such a conclusion by the district court was improper, and 
the district court's order should be reversed to allow this factual issue to be decided. 
II. 
CONCLUSION 
As demonstrated above, as well as in UBIC's opening brief, the targeted tender rule 
is not, as WCF claims, some obscure, minority position. While the facts giving rise to a 
targeted tender situation are rare, those courts that have considered it have nearly 
unanimously adopted it. The rule recognizes that the insured, who purchased the policies, 
has the right to determine whether to make a claim under these policies. It is illogical that 
an insurer should have greater rights than an insured, and nonsensical that another insurer, 
who is not even a party to the insurance contact, can force another insurer to pay a claim 
against the express wishes of the insured. The rule also recognizes that where there are no 
other policies required to pay, because of the election of the insured, there cannot be a claim 
for equitable contribution. There is no liability on an insurer to pay unless, and until, 
requested by the insured. Another insurer cannot trigger this liability. 
In this case, the facts are clear with regard to targeted tender. The claim of Mr. 
Antone was tendered by Pioneer to WCF. WCF paid benefits to Mr. Antone consistent with 
its policy, and which it was liable to pay once the claim was tendered to it by Pioneer. 
However, the claim was never tendered by Pioneer to UBIC. This fact is undisputed. UBIC, 
therefore, has no liability to pay. The wishes of Pioneer should be upheld, and the targeted 
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tender rule should be adopted in Utah. The order of the district court should be reversed and 
judgment entered in favor of UBIC. 
While the facts are clear with regard to targeted tender, the facts are vehemently 
contested regarding mutual mistake. Despite the obvious factual dispute, and the very 
minimal discovery that was conducted in this case, the district court granted WCFs 
premature motion for partial summary judgment. However, despite the puiportedly 
unambiguous nature of the UBIC policy, parol evidence is admissible under Utah law to 
explain the intent of the parties with regard to that policy. UBIC requests that if targeted 
tender is not adopted in Utah, that the order of the district court be reversed and the case be 
remanded so that UBIC may conduct the additional discovery it was prevented from 
conducting by the prematurely and improperly granted motion for summary judgment. 
Respectfully submitted this lQ day of February, 2012. 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC 
Michael E. Dyer / / 
Scott R. Taylor I J 
Attorneys for Utah Businea/lnsurance Company 
Page 24 of 26 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(f)(1), I hereby certify that this brief complies with the 
type-volume limitation. Excluding those parts of the brief exempted by Rule 24(f)( 1 )(B), this 
brief contains 6994 words. 
DATED this I&^~ day of February, 2012. 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC 
Michael E. Dyer 
Scott R. Taylor 
Attorneys for Utah Business Insurance Company 
Page 25 of 26 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
on 
I certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing document were hand delivered 
the ih-yWay of February, 2012 to: 
Utah Supreme Court 
Scott M. Matheson Courthouse 
450 South State Street, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 140210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0210 
(10 copies, one w/ original 
signature; hand delivery) 
James R. Black 
Matthew J. Black 
265E100S,Ste255 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2048 
(2 copies; hand delivery) 
Page 26 of 26 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
